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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 011363

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SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: DISCUSSION OF MEDVEDEV SECURITY PROPOSAL

REF: USNATO NON-PAPER WITH PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONDING TO RUSSIAN EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSALS

Classified By: A/S ACTING MARCIE RIES, EUR
FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

¶1. (C) In advance of Russian DFM Grushko,s February 18 presentation at OSCE to elaborate on President Medvedev,s proposal to establish a new &European Security Treaty,8 we believe NATO Allies should discuss internally our own priorities and principles for approaching the Medvedev idea. We welcome reports of the Czech EU Presidency,s readiness to coordinate with the U.S. and NATO; this is the right course. It seems to us that NATO Allies should coordinate an approach in Brussels on this issue, and that this common line should be reflected and refined as necessary by the NATO Caucus at OSCE in Vienna. We understand that the EU is also holding its own discussions in Brussels and Vienna.

-- The points in para 4 below outline our vision of the way forward. USNATO should seek an opportunity to engage Allies, preferably in the PermReps coffee, on the ideas and approach outlined below prior to the NATO Caucus meeting in Vienna on February 11. USOSCE should draw on these same points in developing a NATO consensus and promoting NATO/EU unity on how to engage DFM Grushko constructively.

¶2. (C) With many European Allies and partners eager to begin a discussion, Russian President Medvedev,s proposal to establish a European Security Treaty will likely command increasing attention in the coming months. Some, such as the UK and the Germans, have begun preliminary discussions with the Russians to gain clarity on Medvedev,s proposal. Most Allies continue to hold positions consistent with the list of principles we developed in November and shared at NATO (ref; this appears below as para 6), and deployed in a unified message to Foreign Minister Lavrov at the Helsinki OSCE Foreign Ministerial, based in part on language agreed in the NATO December ministerial communique. However, as this conversation moves forward we will need to engage actively with Allies and partners to maintain a unified message, which will be our most useful tool in shaping the dialogue on this proposal. As noted above, we believe NATO Allies should develop their thinking on the Medvedev proposal in Brussels, and coordinate in the NATO Caucus in Vienna on discussion with the Russians and other OSCE partners at OSCE in Vienna. OSCE strikes us as the best venue for engaging the Russians directly on this.

¶3. (C) The common EU approach to Medvedev,s proposal, as described to us by the Czech EU Presidency in Vienna, provides a useful starting point for such a strategy. We understand its elements to be:

-- European security is indivisible and is based on shared

values;
-- starting point for security discussion has to be its comprehensive and cross-dimensional nature;
-- existing institutions, commitments and principles must be built upon and strengthened, not diminished.
-- focus must be on restoring trust and promoting progress on protracted conflicts and arms control/CSBMs; and
-- the transatlantic link is vital.

14. (C/REL) Our task is to build on these principles to create an operational plan for responding to Medvedev's proposal in a way that advances our own goals and works to improve the current security architecture. The points below outline Washington's initial thoughts on where our focus should lie, e.g., ways to strengthen existing, values-based structures and the implementation of existing commitments. We should not try to avoid discussing European security with the Russians, but we need to be frank about our own principles and our concerns about Russian ideas. We continue to believe that no case has yet been made to warrant serious negotiations on Medvedev's proposal for a new treaty, and at this stage we are not/not prepared to commit to the idea of an OSCE or other Summit meeting related to the proposal. It makes sense to discuss the ideas the Russians have put in play and use this opportunity to promote our vision of security. We envision an open Europe, not one divided into spheres of influence; characterized by a clear linkage

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between the security between and among states and the values within those states; with steady, consistent support for fulfillment of arms control and political commitments; and respect for the sovereignty of neighbors and all the principles in the Helsinki Final Act.

Key points:

-- Broadly speaking we are interested in discussing ways to improve security, crisis management, and crisis resolution in Europe.

-- Interested in Russian ideas, but we need more specifics to understand Russia's goals regarding European security, e.g., the intended relationship between their ideas for a new treaty and existing structures; the specific problems in the current architecture this proposal seeks to redress; and how to ensure implementation of existing commitments.

-- Any discussions on improving pan-European/Euro-Atlantic security should be based on the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, including the principle of territorial integrity.

-- Existing institutions embody those values, and thus are well-suited to address Europe's security challenges.

-- European security is built on an evolving network of institutions and commitments, not a single instrument or the subordination of one institution to another.

-- It is also correctly built on a comprehensive concept of security that includes human, economic, and political-military dimensions.

-- Willing to work with Russia to consider how we can improve existing frameworks and use them to improve security.

-- Can also begin discussions on how European security can be strengthened through the OSCE, which is the only framework that includes all countries concerned with European security.

-- Such improvements should take place in the context of fulfillment of existing arms control and security commitments. Russia's suspension of CFE implementation raises serious concerns about its commitment to cooperative

security. Agree with others that CFE remains an important pillar of Europe,s security structure.

-- Not opposed to high-level meetings in principle, but only at the right time and when there is sufficient substance.

¶5. (C) In addition, USNATO and USOSCE may draw from the following questions in suggesting issues to be raised with DFM Grushko.

Possible Questions for Discussion:

-- What new threats are we facing in the current environment that are not adequately addressed in previous OSCE security documents? Do any of these threats require the adoption of new principles or guidelines in international behavior?

-- We see inadequate implementation of current arrangements at the crux of the difficulties facing security in Europe. How would Russia,s proposals address this fundamental problem?

-- Does Russia have additional values in mind when it calls for a new security arrangement? Would Russia seek to eliminate some of the values already embodied in our acquis8 in the OSCE? We would not consider renegotiating the Helsinki Final Act.

--What does Russia see as the relationship between its proposal and existing structures?

-- Does Russia still accept the Charter of Paris principle that there should be no spheres of influence? How does that fit with recent statements we have seen about Russia,s &privileged interests in relations with our closest neighbors?8 (FM Lavrov in article in Russian Diplomatic Yearbook 2008)

-- Does Russia accept the principle of host nation consent to the stationing or presence of foreign military forces?

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-- We have also agreed on each country,s right to choose its own alliances and military arrangements. Does Russia see any inconsistency between the right of states to make their own security arrangements and the indivisibility of security?

¶6. (C) Begin Text of USNATO Non-Paper on Principles for Responding to Russian European Security Proposals:

In reference to our upcoming discussion on the Russian proposals for a new European Security Treaty, we suggest the following principles for NAC consideration and agreement:

-- Russia needs to explain exactly what it is proposing, how it treats existing security frameworks, and why Allies should engage with Russia on this initiative at a time when Russia has failed to honor its commitments under existing agreements, particularly those involving respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;

-- We already have good institutions*OSCE, COE, NATO, and EU*which are already available for engagement with Russia;

-- Any discussions on improving pan-European/Euro-Atlantic security should be based on the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris;

-- We should maintain and, where possible, enhance the comprehensive concept of security that includes the human and economic dimensions, as well as the political-military aspects;

-- The U.S. and Canada should remain part of any European security discussions; and

-- Any discussion with Russia should take place in Vienna with all concerned parties, but NATO should coordinate positions in advance, similar to the way we handle CFE (HLTF in Brussels and JCG in Vienna).

End Text.
CLINTON